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STYLE AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
EDUCATIONAL ROLE IN
GOVERNMENT
Mark Tushnet*
The Supreme Court, we are told, is-or at least could be-a
republican schoolmaster,t an educative institution.2 Through its
decisions and, even more, the written opinions that provide the
rationales for its decisions, the Court leads the people of the
United States to a deeper understanding of our constitutional
commitments. As our understanding improves, the policies we
pursue improve as well.
This picture of the Court's role is undeniably attractive.3 Its
outlines need filling in, though. Claims for the Court as educator
face an immediate difficulty. Surveys indicate rather low levels
of public knowledge about the Court's work in general, and even
lower levels of knowledge about particular decisions. 4 How,
then, could the Court educate the public about the true meaning
of the Constitution?
One possibility is that it can do so by imposing its vision on
the society, hoping that people will adjust their understandings to
the reality they face. As Felix Cohen put it, the Court could edu* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Georgetown University.
1. Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 127.
2. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961 {1992).
3. Of course the account finesses hard questions about how the Justices are to find
out what our "deep" commitments are; what appear to be deep commitments from one
perspective will often appear to be fundamental moral errors from another. This is,
though, a criticism available against essentially everything that anyone has ever written
about the Supreme Court, and it may be a positive virtue to finesse the questions that
make such a criticism cogent.
4. See David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics
378 {W.W. Norton, 3d ed. 1993) ("Most of the Court's decisions attract neither media nor
widespread public attention"); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts
Bring About Social Change? 125-27 (U. of Chi. Press, 1991) (citing studies showing, e.g.,
that "only about 40 percent of the American public, at best, follows Supreme Court actions," and that in 1966, "46 percent of a nationwide sampling could not recall anything at
all that the Court had recently done").
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cate by taking advantage of the normative power of the actual.s
To do so, however, the Court would first have to ensure that it
could indeed create the reality to which people would adjust.
Yet, lacking the power of the purse or the sword, possessing only
judgment, the Court's ability directly to coerce as the preface to
education is limited.
Here the reaction to the Supreme Court's flag-burning decisions deserves note. As the episode ran its course, it turned out
that the Court's decisions, however apparently unpopular, were
not inconsistent with the views of the national political elite; notably, slightly over forty percent of the members of the House of
Representatives refused to vote for a constitutional amendment
to overturn the Court's decisions.6
The flag-burning decisions show the Court successfully leading and, arguably, educating the public through its decisions
alone, for, as Christopher Eisgruber has argued, Justice Brennan's opinion in Texas v. Johnson failed to achieve the rhetorical
effect for which it strove. Eisgruber points out that in its concluding rhetoric the opinion distances the Court from the deeply
held views of those who enacted the laws against flag-burning:
Justice Brennan "begin[s] with the oddly coy, 'We are tempted to
say,' and conclud[es] with 'Texas sees."' This statement separates the Court and its defense of constitutional values from the
people of Texas.1 As Eisgruber says, Brennan's closing paragraph, which ends by asking those who see a flag burned to salute the flag and give it a decent burial, is "well-intended, but
ultimately ridiculous."s
Texas v. Johnson illustrates how an opinion whose rhetoric
fails to capture the reader's imagination can nonetheless alter reality and in so doing educate the public about the Constitution.
The Court can change reality through its decisions in several
ways; none, however, seem to provide an adequate account of
the Court's educative role.
Consider first how a political adviser might describe the
Court's situation. The adviser would learn from the Justices that
they hold views that are different from-as they would put it,

5. Quoted by Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 71 (1965).
6. The vote was 254 in favor, 177 against.
7. Eisgruber, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 982 (cited in note 2).
8. Id.

1994]

SUPREME COURT'S EDUCATIONAL STYLE

217

ahead of-the views prevalent in the society.9 An astute adviser
might point out that if the Justices' views are only a bit ahead of
society's, they might be able to educate society simply by enforcing their views. They would, on this account, pull the rest of society along, a task made easier by the relatively short distance
society has to travel (or, in the educational metaphor, the relatively small amount of learning society has to do ).10
If, in contrast, the Justices' views are well in advance of society's, a political adviser would probably suggest that they face a
substantially more difficult task. If they attempt to enforce their
views directly, they run a significant risk that what they do will be
ignored.tt A political adviser might suggest that the Justices
move incrementally toward the goal they prefer. After one small
step changes reality, society may adjust by coming to accept
views closer to the Justices'. Succeeding steps might end where
the Justices originally began.tz
Robert Burt has recently offered an alternative account of
how the Court's decisions may alter reality, by keeping contending visions of the constitutional good in constant dialogue.13 The
Court's decisions matter, according to Burt, not because the decisions themselves coercively alter reality, but because they operate as signals to the public of the characteristics of acceptable
resolutions of persistent conflict. A decision that awards a complete victory to one side is, on Burt's view, unlikely to lead to
social peace. Like violent suppression of dissent, such decisions
9. Here "ahead of' does not mean, as it often might, "more liberal than." Conservatives seeking to change the views of a liberal public could properly describe themselves as ahead of the public.
10. The flag-burning decisions do not fit this account directly, though they do, I
argue below, when the role of national political elites is taken into account.
11. The Court's aborted attempt to abolish the death penalty is probably the best
recent example. And, it may be worth noting, the Court's 1972 decision was so highly
fractured that the public could not know why the Court said the death penalty was unconstitutional, only that the Court said so. The decision, that is, could not possibly have
educated the public. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The example may be ambiguous, though, because at the time the Court acted it might not have seemed to the
Justices that they were too far ahead of the public. Public support for the death penalty
had recently reached historic lows, and was only beginning to rise again in the early 1970s.
Abolitionist Justices might have thought that a Court decision would contribute to the
long-term decline in support for capital punishment. For an elegant argument that politicalleadership is essential to abolition of capital punishment, see Franklin E. Zimring and
Gordon Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the American Agenda (Cambridge U. Press,
1986).
12. This strategy, of course, runs the risk that it can be carried out only over a substantial period, during which the Court's membership might change. Some new members
might not want to take further steps, or might even want to "retreat." If so, the Justices
who sought larger changes would be thwarted from within the Court.
13. Robert A. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict (Belknap Press, 1992).
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forcibly shove persistent conflict beneath the surface without alleviating it. In contrast, by structuring its results to concede some
validity to all sides in conflict, the Court can assist the public in
working out a resolution of the conflict. Sometimes Burt suggests that the Court provides a structure for dialogue about the
conflict,1 4 but the force of his argument lies in the claim that the
Court's contribution lies in keeping in dialogue people who
otherwise would seek other methods of resolving their conflict.Is
A third, and more common, explanation of the Court's educative role is that the Court educates through what it says to the
public in its opinions. Joseph Goldstein provides a recent example.16 He seeks a constitutional law that would be more "intelligible" by being presented to the public in more readily
understandable opinions. Intelligibility is essential, Goldstein argues, to maintain the Constitution as
something that We can understand if We are to remain sovereign .... If Ours is to be an 'intelligent democracy,' ... We the
People . . . must be able to learn, from Our reading of the
Constitution and the Supreme Court's construction of it, what
rights We have and do not have ... [f]or then We can meet

14. Two difficulties with such a suggestion deserve note. Plainly dialogue about the
positions in conflict already occurs, so the Court's decisions do no more than replace one
structure for dialogue with another. Few if any normative conclusions can flow from such
a substitution. And, if the Court's structure assists in resolving conflict because it has a
normative tilt in favor of one side, the Court's contribution lies in its substantive position,
a conclusion that Burt assiduously avoids.
15. Among those other methods is force, and, as others have noted, one of the
weakest points in Burt's argument is his intellectually honest insistence that the conflict
over slavery ought to have been addressed as he suggests, by acknowledging the validity
of the claims of slaves and slaveholders. For discussion of Burt's argument on slavery, see
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, 10 Const. Comm. 221, 224-25 (1993) (reviewing
Burt, The Constitution in Conflict (cited in note 13)). The alternative there, of course, was
war, and Abraham Lincoln offered the best answer to claims like Burt's:
If we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offenses which, in the
providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His
appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and
South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall
we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a Living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope-fervently do
we pray-that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God
wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two hundred
and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood
drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said
three thousand years ago, so still it must be said 'the judgments of the Lord, are
true and righteous altogether."'
2 Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 687 (Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., Library of
America, 1989) (Second Inaugural Address).
16. Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution (Oxford U. Press, 1992).
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Our responsibility as informed citizens to respond to what the
Court did and why it did it.t7

Goldstein argues that the Justices "have a professional obligation
to articulate in comprehensible and accessible language the constitutional principles on which their judgments rest," an obligation that he believes they have failed to honor.ts Goldstein
recommends that the Justices adopt certain "guidelines for maintaining the intelligibility of the Constitution," the first and presumably most important of which is, "Use simple and precise
language 'level to the understanding of all."' Or, quoting from
Justice Hugo Black, "Write it so your Mamma can understand
it."l9
Yet, if public knowledge about particular outcomes in cases
is low, surely public knowledge of the content of the Court's
opinions, the precise ways in which it articulates the principles it
finds in the Constitution, is lower.zo Indeed, Goldstein's account
seems to depend on the clearly mistaken view that the general
public actually reads Supreme Court opinions; otherwise it seems
nearly irrelevant whether its opinions are intelligible. Other than
the New York Times, which sometimes reprints excerpts of major
opinions, most newspapers provide at most a few sentences from
opinions. The Justices can expect no more than that the public
will know the outcomes of particularly salient cases, such as the
flag-burning or abortion decisions, and perhaps one or two memorable lines in the opinions.
I believe that those memorable lines play an important part
in the Court's educational effort. The memorable lines are expressions of the personalities of individual Justices in an otherwise bureaucratic institution, who use their distinctive phrasings
to generate a sense among opinion leaders that the Justices are
serious people who ought to have the public's trust.
My argument starts with the observation that the Court
faces its most difficult educational task when it does something
inconsistent with the judgments of the people it seeks to edu17. Id. at 5, 6.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 112.
20. Perhaps public knowledge is low because of the turgidity of the Court's opinions, and would improve if the Court changed the way in which its opinions were written.
I find this suggestion quite implausible, if only because of the widely observed simplification of political discourse in recent years. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 215-16 (Harv. U. Press, 1993). No matter how hard the Justices try, they are unlikely
to get their opinions stripped down to a ten-second sound bite (although of course, as I
argue in the text, they may consciously attempt to insert such sound bites into their
opinions).
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cate-when, that is, it strikes down popular programs.21 We
might contrast the Court with bureaucracies whose programs are
validated by their outcomes. Because the Court's outcomes are
unpalatable to the public when they are stated, the Court cannot
rely on the outcomes themselves to educate the public.
Fortunately for the Justices, neither the general public nor
opinion leaders can devote much time to assessing the particulars
of the Court's performance. They must rely instead on a general
sense of what the Court has done and is doing. If the Court
seems to be trustworthy in general, opinion leaders may be willing to "cut it some slack" on decisions with which they initially
disagree mildly. Editorials and op-ed articles may explain why
the Court's decision actually makes sense. Conversely, if opinion
leaders generally mistrust the Court, they may escalate their criticisms precisely to limit the success the Court might otherwise
have in educating the public to its views.
How, then, can the Justices develop the trust which, on this
account, is essential to their successful performance of the educative role? One method is suggested in The Federalist Papers. In
discussing elections, Publius faced the problem of explaining how
self-interested electors would select representatives of "the most
attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters" who would be more public-regarding than the voters themselves.zz With respect to the House of Representatives, where
direct elections would occur, the Constitution offered the answer
that electoral districts would be large enough to restrict the
number of plausible candidates. To run for office, a person
would already have to be well-known. To become well-known, in
turn, the potential candidate would have to display his or her
more diffusive character, generally through prior public service.
The particular problem that concerned Publius is irrelevant
to the Supreme Court, but the general thought is not. People
demonstrate their character through their public actions, which
provide the basis for evaluating their fitness for higher public of21. The Court has a subsidiary educational role, emphasized by Charles Black, in
ensuring that it communicate effectively the proposition that in refusing to strike down a
statute as unconstitutional the Court is not affirmatively approving the statute. Cf.
Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Coun: Judicial Review in a Democracy 48-53
(Macmillan, 1960) (describing "legitimating" function of judicial review); Alexander M.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Coun at the Bar of Politics 29-31
(Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) (developing Black's argument). For a passage indicating the
Court's understanding of this subsidiary role, see San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973).
22. The Federalist No. 10 83 (James Madison) (New American Library, Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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fice. What potential Justices have done, that is, allows us to consider whether we ought to place our trust in them.23
Performance after appointment can also generate trust.24
At this point judicial style begins to matter. Recall that the question is how the Court can gain support for decisions that the public may initially find troublesome or even deeply wrong.
Precisely because the decisions are unpopular, the Court cannot
rely on the substance of the decisions themselves to generate
support. Rather, it has to rely on either the manner in which the
decisions are made-their style-or the more diffuse support the
Court has generated from other decisions that the public has already come to support.
Here the flag-burning cases are again informative. I have
argued that they educated by changing reality. Consider, though,
the possibility that they educated by effectively communicating
the Court's vision of the good constitutional order. That communication could have occurred only indirectly, because the opinions were flawed stylistically. The Court's opinions were
translated for the public by the media. The flag-burning cases
succeeded, on this view, because editorialists and op-ed page
commentators were able to take the results and explain why the
Court's action was profoundly correct, at least according to the
editorialists' understanding of the Constitution's deepest
commitments.
Whether or not this account of the flag-burning cases' effects
is accurate, it suggests that often the Court educates the public
indirectly. The general public knows some particular outcomes
in controversial cases through the media and other opinion leaders.zs Those leaders are likely to be somewhat more attentive to
23. This may account for what seems to me a widespread sense that Supreme Court
nominees ordinarily should have a long career in public service, so that service on the
Court is the culmination of, or at least an extension of, their careers. Thurgood Marshall
and Lewis Powell provide relatively recent examples. In contrast, much of the apparent
unease about the aborted nomination of Douglas Ginsburg, some of the unease about the
nomination of Clarence Thomas, and some of the unease about David Souter's nomination may have occurred precisely because they had not served a national constituency
long enough to generate the trust that nominees should. See Marshall: Speaking lll of the
Dead, Newsweek, Aug. 6, 1990, at 18 (when asked about Souter's nomination, Justice
Marshall replied, "Never heard of him. And when his name came down, I was listening to
television ... I called my wife and said, 'Have I ever heard of this man?'").
24. Of course, life tenure means that we are unable to do anything about a Justice
who, after appointment, fails to generate trust.
25. This argument tracks a familiar, albeit arguably outmoded, theme in the general
political science literature about political knowledge and behavior. According to political
scientists, political information occurs in a "'two-step flow' ... from the media to the
attentive public ... [and then] from the attentive public to the inattentive public." James
David Barber, Citizen Politics: An Introduction to Political Behavior 59 (Markham Pub.
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the Court's opinions as well as to its decisions. Knowing this,
Justices seeking to educate the public might try to capture the
attention of opinion leaders.
The Justices then must deal with the problem that, for better
or worse, the Court has become one of the nation's governing
bureaucracies. Opinion leaders know that what appears under
the names of individual Justices are rarely the products of the
Justice's own pen or word-processor. Surely, an opinion cannot
carry the weight of Justice's prior public service when it is written
by a recent law school graduate serving as the Justice's law
clerk.26
Here the memorable phrases matter. They are the eruptions
of individual idiosyncracy in the otherwise bureaucratic operations of the Supreme Court.27 Whatever else media observers
believe about the Court's opinions, they attribute these memorable phrases directly to the Justices. Sometimes the memorable
phrases are used self-consciously, as in Chief Justice Warren's reported desire to have the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education written so that it would be "readable by the lay public."2s
His statement in Reynolds v. Sims that "[l]egislators represent
people, not trees or acres," might be criticized for its content but
Co., 2d ed., 1972). Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? at 126-27 (cited in note 4), argues against this claim in the specific context of civil
rights, but not with respect to the Court's actions overall, which is my concern.
26. This is true even though the Justice, as bureaucratic supervisor, is responsible for
and stands behind the opinion. (A typical way to address this concern is to assert that,
although the Justice did not draft the opinion, he or she read it with extreme care and
made detailed editorial changes in the draft prepared by the law clerk. I believe that
some time soon that myth will receive the same burial that the myth that Justices write
their own opinions already has.)
27. Of course it is easier to include such lines in separate opinions joined by no
other Justice. The Court has developed a norm that requires deference to the stylistic
choices made by an opinion's author. See, e.g., Warren Burger to Harry Blackmun,
March 5, 1985 ("I regularly join opinions whose style and adjectives I don't particularly
fancy but I 'go along' because the style is for the author of an opinion"; Justice Blackmun
ojected to Burger's description of court of appeals' interpretation in CIA v. Sims as "crabbed," but Burger "consider[ed] 'crabbed' the mildest term I could use in the circumstances shown in this case"), Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, Box 363,
file 6. When a Justice objects to an idiosyncratic "tone" of an opinion, however, the
author will often remove some of the objectionable phrases. See, e.g., Harry Blackmun to
Antonin Scalia, June 9, 1988 ("I have withheld my vote ... because the tone of the
opinion has disturbed me somewhat .... [W]hat concerns me is the repeated criticism of
the Ninth Circuit and its Judges"); Antonin Scalia to Harry Blackmun, June 9, 1988 (no
one should be foreclosed from joining an opinion "solely because of its tone," and
describing changes to be made in next version of opinion in Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Pangilinan), Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, Box 446, file 13.
28. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and
Black America's Struggle for Equality 696 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1975).
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not for its rhetorical power.29 Or consider here the opening sentence of the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. "3o
This almost visibly strives for rhetorical effect, which is to say
that its authors seem to have wanted to have the sentence
quoted.31
By pointing out that Court opinions educate by combining
outcomes with memorable phrases, I suggest that style is socially
located, like everything else.32 As Gary Peller has noted, the
newspapers' plain style, like Goldstein's guideline regarding simplicity and precision, are located in the "white, upper-middle
class, eastern seaboard intelligentsia," and imply "that the reader
and writer are both rational, civilized, right-thinking people, and
that the world can be captured in common-sense, no-nonsense
descriptions. "33 Without committing myself to the precise social
analysis Peller offers, I believe his comments do point in the right
direction. Because style is socially located, we ought to think
about how the style of judicial opinions can contribute to their
educational effect in society as it is presently constituted. What,
that is, are the social circumstances under which judicial style
educates?
The Court educates the public by acting through opinion
leaders, and memorable phrases affect the way those leaders see
the Court. Because opinion leaders fit at least roughly Peller's
description, quotable phrases in Supreme Court opinions will
seem to them eminently sensible expressions of what the Constitution must mean.
It follows that what counts as a memorable line changes.
The rhythms of John Marshall's opinions in Marbury v.
Madison34 and Gibbons v. Ogden3s are foreign to today's read29. 377 u.s. 533, 562 (1964).
30. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992).
31. Ironically, the evident desire to have a rhetorical effect weakens the sentence's
actual rhetorical effect.
32. For an earlier discussion, see Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional
Discourse, 81 Geo. L.J. 251 (1992).
33. Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 Geo. L.J. 313, 322
(1992).
34. See, e.g., 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the court is, solely,
to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court").
35. See, e.g., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) ("[T]he power over commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it
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ers, and would be at best quaintly archaic in a contemporary
opinion. Edmund Wilson's famous argument about the chastening of the American prose style after the Civil War tries to explain why.36 Today's newspapers' plain style communicates more
effectively.
Even here, though, distinctions can be made. For example,
consider the flatness of Justice Stewart's comment on hard-core
pornography, "I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that."37 As Catherine MacKinnon has
pointed out, at least in retrospect Justice Stewart's statement,
with its explicit reliance on his own perspective ("when I see it"),
not only fails to confront the alternative perspectives of those
who would regulate the availability of pornography but brings
the differences in perspective to the surface.Js And, on a different level, the statement is memorably quotable only because
readers elide the lumpiness of the full sentence.39
The opening sentence in Casey provides another example of
how quotable sentences help the Justices carry out their educational mission.40 After reading no more than that "[l]iberty finds
no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt," readers know that the
Court has definitively resolved the question about whether strict
prohibitions of abortion are constitutionally permissible. The
opinion sets itself as the defender of "liberty," providing it a "refuge" by eliminating "doubt." Consider as well the images
evoked by refuge: a haven, a comfortable resting place, a home.
The opinion attempts to soothe controversy by describing the
would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the
exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom
and discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its
abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments").
36. Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gore 635-69 (Oxford U. Press, 1966).
37. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
38. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law
90 (Harv. U. Press, 1987).
39. On this, compare Justice Souter's dry, "We are honored," American Nat'/ Red
Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465,2471 n.7 (1992). The "we" here lifts the response above the
personalized criticisms offered by Justice Scalia, evokes the royal "we" and thereby asserts for the Court a magisterial position, and more particularly evokes Queen Victoria's
statement, "We are not amused," and thereby further elevates the Court above its internal critic.
40. My comments here are indebted to a presentation by Professor Marie Ashe of
Suffolk University Law School at the Constitutional Law Workshop of the Association of
American Law Schools, Ann Arbor, June 1993.

1994]

SUPREME COURT'S EDUCATIONAL STYLE

225

Court itself as a refuge, removed from the controversy that surrounds the abortion issue.4t
Finally, it seems worth suggesting that today's Justices display judicial temperament by combining an overall bureaucratic
operation with outcroppings of individualism, their quotable
sentences. The quotable sentences show opinion leaders that a
real person occupies a seat on the Court. The Court's more bureaucratic aspects, including the dull sentences and opinions that
predominate in the U.S. Reports, show them that the Justices are
sober, responsible, and trustworthy people. When such people
do something that might trouble the public, opinion leaders stand
ready to reassure us that, because the Justices are "serious people," we ought to dampen our discomfort with their decisions.42
Of course, if we do not occupy the same social location that
opinion leaders do, we might find their reassurances feeble.

41. I note, however, that the sentence's content is belied by virtually everything that
follows in th~ join~ opinion: a defense of stare decisis conjoined with overruling major
cases, the arttculatiOn of a new test for determining when regulations of abortion are
constitutionally permissible, accompanied inevitably by new doubts about the test's concrete meaning.
42. Perhaps this may explain what seems to me a discomfort expressed by some with
Justice Scalia's opinions that goes beyond mere disagreement with his results. Their occasional acerbic tone, and what might be called their "mere" cleverness, may undermine the
sense of seriousness necessary for a Justice to be an educator (beyond a relatively small
circle of acolytes).

